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    Chapter 1. 
 
   Religion: a first approach. 
 
  Do you think you can take over the universe and improve it? 
 3 
  I do not believe it can be done. (Lao Tsu: Tao Te Ching). 
 
1. Religion, evolution and imagination. 
Human beings are constantly confronted with overwhelming order in the world: the cycle of day and 
night, the unerring concatenation of the seasons, the processes of birth, growth, adulthood, old age and 
death in precisely that order. Occasionally something unexpected or ‘unorderly’ happens: someone 
drifts into a coma, or seems to awaken ‘out of death’, a  storm devastates the meticulous work of 
generations, or an individual person  proves able to predict or foretell what nobody can expect. 
 
Dreams seem to give us access to a world with so-called counternatural things: in a dream one can fly 
like a bird, one can change in body and soul, or one can become young again.  Different religions 
focus on the manipulation of dreams. Others alter one’s heartbeat or one’s body temperature by mere 
respiration techniques. Poisonous substances are consumed during rituals without fatal effects, and 
people get visions while in trance. In the western attitude of the past hundred years or so we have 
learned to draw a sharp line to demarcate so-called dependable knowledge (mostly the modernist 
instrumental rationality as in science and technology) from belief or religion. Mostly in the wake of 
christian dualism, I think, we drew an official and politically sanctioned line between knowledge and 
religion. However, we sometimes cross the line, and invest in somewhat religious expectations about 
the dependability and problem solving power of science. In other words, we sometimes project our 
needs for safety and certainty from the religious way into the fallible endeavor of science and 
technology. On the other hand, the relative range of one and the other way is debated: e.g., the 
christian cosmologist Max Wildiers (1977) states that religion should be totally separated from 
cosmology (and science in general), while presentday colleagues of his start to rediscuss the place of 
God in a theory of the universe (Hawking, 1992 to name one). Still another line of approach is to 
invite young social scientific disciplines like psychology, sociology and anthropology to shed their 
light on the religious complex and describe it as a particular category of psychological, social or 
cultural phenomena. In that endeavor the insights of the social scientist are assessed by religious 
people as dealing only with superficial aspects of religion and paasing by the more intrinsic ones. That 
is to say, one accepts that the form of organization and communication of religion, or even the 
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psychological processes of the believer can be described adequately by the scientist, but that the core 
or essence of religion is ultimately beyond scientific investigation. This critique is nonsensical if it 
claims that religion is necessarily or intrinsically beyond research. It is recognizable as stemming from 
a particular line of philosophy which resorts in the typical essentialistic category (like Heidegger and 
followers) where the ‘essence’ of religion is claimed to be beyond the reach of science. Whether or not 
an essence exists is irrelevant for this discussion, but the study of essences is not what science is about. 
In Differentia 0 I explain what view of science I defend and how the status and  the function of science 
relates to those of religion for me.  
The distinction between religion and science does not solve all our problems, however. I already 
pointed to dreams, but there is more. All knowledge, including scientific knowledge, rests on or is 
inspired by intuitions. That is to say, prior to discursive knowledge are direct and prerational insights 
about the world. For example, the deep conviction in the western tradition that everything can be seen 
and thought of as if from the outside, is a very powerful intuition in the West. We share the intuition of 
th ‘God’s eye view’, that is to say, we look upon things, people, the earth and indeed the whole 
universe as if we were able to take the point of view of the only outsider, that is God (in our tradition). 
We have the conviction we can mentally position ourselves alongside Him and ‘look over his 
shoulders’ to the world and ourselves. Of course, this need not be a universal human intuition. In fact, 
anthropologists know that this intuition is rather specific for our tradition. Nevertheless, it plays a 
crucial role in our knowledge system, even though we cannot really grasp it. Similar critical remarks 
can be made about other such deep or pervasive notions in the knowledge process. Take 
consciousness, for example. Western psychology distinguishes between the mental and the 
physiological, even in the organization of research (the first belongs to the social sciences, and the 
second to the medical or the natural sciences). Within the realm of the mental a variety of layers is 
indicated by conscious, preconscious, subconscious, eventually supplemented by the soul or 
conscience. The Japanese or Hindu seem to reject this complex radically by substituting it with a 
synthetic notion of ‘bodymind’ (Shaner, 1989, Roland, 1989). In doing so, the very realm of 
knowledge and that of religion may be subject to radically different organization and functioning. 
Then what are we discussing when we study ‘religion’ around the world? How are we going to 
compare what seems incomparable at first sight? My approach will be to study the religious 
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phenomena from the point of view of the study of human beings. In a first step I focus on the human 
species. 
 
1. Within the frame of evolutionism I claim that the human species is distinct from other species in 
particular features. What strikes me with regard to religion (as well as knowledge and art) and what I 
give the status of a postulate in my approach is that, to my knowledge, the human species is the only 
one which is capable of imagination. In other words: the members of this species can fantasize and 
represent reality in a way that differs from what is perceived or experienced, and construe action 
schemes, concepts and values on the basis of that imagining. Some animal species can imitate what 
they borrow from others (e.g., the parrot  can imitate sounds), and some can simulate (as in the 
mimicry of the cameleon). But as far as we know only human beings can say or pretend anything at 
all, deny blatant or inescapable realities, change the view of his own past, imagine beings that just 
cannot exist and organize social life according to that imagining. This peculiar capacity makes the 
species unique, I think. With the postulate of such a capacity art can be understood as the adding of 
form beyond graspable reality. But also knowledge needs this capacity to grow into large world views 
and scientific constructs. In my view religion must be appreciated within that frame too: people act in 
nonfunctional or non-instrumental ways, beyond direct or foreseeable survival value, for instance.  
E.g., a catholic priest eats a piece of bread and believes that it is,  in   a symbolical way, the body of 
Christ. Of course, this is not anthropophagy, neither is it an ordinary meal. This is a symbolic act, 
meaning that the ordinary acts of the performance acquire a different function, content or sense 
through the imagination process. In language too, we are creative in this particular way: e.g., the 
Navajo Indian performs a ceremony and repeats a particular formula four times. Sometimes four 
colors are named, sometimes the four cardinal directions are mentioned in the sequal, or sometimes 
four forces in nature are pointed at. The quadruple form of the verbal message indicates that we are in 
the symbolic realm here, in the realm of fantasy and imagining.  By saying the formula four times, the 
Navajo uses the words ‘compulsively’, and tries to manipulate reality in a particular way.  
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I think that this unique human feature, which I indicate as the faculty of fantasy or creativity, is 
specific for the species. I will not investigate how it can be explained evolutionarily 1 , but I postulate 
that religion in all its forms and appearances can be understood by this faculty. The faculty of fantasy 
is a necessary condition for the emergence of the religious in my approach. Whether it is a sufficient 
condition, which can allow to distinguish religion from other human products, or that can help to 
differentiate between different religions, remains to be seen. In my approach, the comparative study of 
religious phenomena will help us in this respect;  
Social sciences and philosophy have the audacity to study the most complex phenomena in the world: 
a human being, a group, let alone a group with its history are much more complex than mere 
biological matter (like a cell). This may be a main reason why in the past centuries we witnessed a 
focus on the nearby in these disciplines: psychologists study their own children or their students, 
sociologists study American or European groups, educationalists speak about THE school and mean 
the particular institution which was created in just one part of the world, philosophers speak about 
universal logic and they refer to Ancient Greek and European ways of thinking only, and so on. The 
comparative approach is at the most peripheral, if not absent in the whole endeavor. From the point of 
view of scientific knowledge with true universalistic pretentions, this is a severe handicap: we land up 
with local knowledges, in all likelihood. 
2. The only group of researchers with systematic interest in other traditions is the group of 
anthropologists.  Anthropologists have moved to the outskirts of the world to experience and describe 
how people live and think with different traditions of education and different intuitions about the 
world. The anthropologists have seen a lot, they have explained very little, and they seem to be 
plunged now in a deep crisis: they learned they were hardly able to report on their fellow human 
beings without prejudices, and they were always categorizing others within the western frame they 
themselves had been reared in. Anthropologists time and again claimed that the only way out of this 
                                                 
1
 I refer to D.T. Campbell’s hierarchy of selectors in this instance (Campbell, 1974). 
On the other hand, the recent combination of evolutionary  psychology and cognitive 
archeology , like in Mithen (1996) explores a similar line of thought on the nature of 
religion: at a certain stage in human evolution the imagination and its symbolic 
expressions are born. Processes of crossing between domains or modules in the 
brain induce more abstract and distanced thinking and hence allow for religion, art 
and higher knowledge processes. 
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catch  lies in the development of a genuine comparative approach to matters (Nader, 1993). The group 
of colleagues who specialized in philology and culture history (and who were very active in religious 
studies) might have been a competitor to anthropologists in this field. However, they are so much 
focused on texts only, working within a frame of thought that owes so much to nineteenth century 
european (and hence colonial) attitudes, that they have been severely and mercilessly criticized for 
their ‘orientalism’ by the subjects they study (Said, 1979). The move towards comparison is akward in 
their disciplines , as will become clear in the next chapter.  
When I  describe any religious practice I will invariably draw on the intuitions, biases and concepts I 
can master, i.e., primarily those from my own cultural tradition. This is a handicap, which I have to 
become conscious of (Nader’s comparative consciousness is meant to be an alternative),  in order to go 
beyond it. On the other hand, acquiring knowledge by spending considerable time and energy in 
another religion or tradition than my own seems to be a necessary way to overcome my initial 
handicap. Since each tradition has its complexity, it is hardly possible, both physically and mentally, 
to come to know many, let alone all religious traditions (e.g., reckoning with the 4000 traditions of 
anthropological classifications). This is a second handicap: by necessity, any comparative study must 
be limited to a deeper knowledge of only very few different traditions. 
To overcome both handicaps and land up with a genuine scientific model or theory my only way is to 
construct a comparative approach with the following features. It should be selfcritical, in that it 
contextualises and screens my own insights and cultural forms as what they are: local imaginings, 
stemming from just one particular tradition. In the second place, I need to go beyond the boundaries of 
the religious field in my own tradition and consider that field as just one particular expression or 
format of the faculty of the religious, at the same level as and yet different from such expressions as 
American Indian  ceremonies, Buddhist meditations or shaman travels. The comparative stance I have 
to come up with must allow to produce each of these formats of the religious as ever so many 
specifications of the same faculty of fantasy.  
 
2. Religion: a first attempt at delineating the domain. 
In order to allow for a relevant approach to the variegated domain of religious phenomena I need to 
indicate what is understood by ‘religion’ as a domain of study. I am of the conviction that the search 
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for definitions and batlles over definitions are  basically a waste of time, even if a lot of my colleagues 
in philosophy and the humanities still prove to think otherwise. A scientific approach, I claim, 
describes as precisely as possible how things work, by characterizing relevant parameters and their 
interrelationships, not by aiming for the utter definition of a phenomenon. Still, in order to begin to 
study parameters it is sensible to advance a working definition, which indicates what is roughly the 
field of research (and what falls outside of it).  
The domain of religion all human imagining activities which attempt to symbolically fill in the 
relationships between humans as particular mortal beings, and the imagined reality which transcends 
them. These relationships are transfered from generation to generation. Phrased differently: religion 
is a particular way  of dealing with wholeness, which transcends the spatiotemporal limitations of 
each particular human being.  
 
The mention of ‘symbolic’ in this circumscription points to a particularity of the religious phenomena: 
the result of the imagining process is not testable like in knowledge, nor is it basically a matter of form 
or style, like in artistic creativity. These features can be claimed by a religious person, but they are not 
intrinsic, I suggest. The way of dealing with the world in religious matters is symbolic, which first and 
foremost refers to the plurality in  meanings and uses of the language and activities in a religious 
tradition. In a later section, the notion of ‘symbol’ will be dealt with in detail. The human activities 
refered to can be diverse: ritual actions, prayers, representations, beliefs, and many others are 
candidates. The imagination can fill in the symbol in a variety of ways, allowing for such notions or 
‘things’ as gods, infinity, a cyclic world, or what have you. The important point is that all of these 
manifestations or vehicles of the religious have a symbolic appearance. 
Secondly, my focus is on human activities: I take the stand that action or activity is the basic form of 
human-environment relationships. Verbal actions (speech acts) and beliefs or representations are seen 
as particular subcategories of human action. Especially the study of nonwestern cultural and religious 
phenomena has taught us that the heavy emphasis on meaning and verbal actions (not to mention 
texts) is culture specific and largely restricted to the mediterranean traditions (Hymes, 1981). 
Thirdly, religion has to do with human imagination. The particular religious forms and moulds of 
imagination will allow me to delineate the religious from other domains where imagination plays a 
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prominent role, like knowledge and art. Sometimes  these domains will overlap considerably (like in 
the European Middle Ages), sometimes they will complement each other. A somewhat similar point of 
view can be seen in the latest book of another anthropologist, Raymond Firth (1996). He calls his 
theory ‘humanistic’ and encounters a similar useasiness in the field of religious studies that I do:  
 ‘If one accepts inadequacy, aggression, evil, suffering, as part of the endowment  
 of man, then why should one not regard imagination, creative effort, aesthetic   
 inspiration, love, as also part of human constitution? On such a sceptical   
  foundation, to theo-logy succeeds anthropo-logy-the study of God is included in 
  the study of man.’ (Firth, 1996:92). 
I want to be a bit more specific and say that the study of God or the religious is part of the study of the 
human capacity of imagination. 
Fourthly, religious activities of imagination are not invented by each individual. They are transfered 
through learning processes in groups and communities. Since it is the individual who is learning, it is 
likely that individual interpretations will alter the tradition to some extent, but the notion of an 
individual religion remains an oddity to my mind, because the transfer between groups and 
communities is an intrinsic feature of the religious domain: individual learners are always situated in 
contexts. 
Finally, religious activities are the human means ‘par excellence’ to reach, express or otherwise fill in 
‘wholeness’.  
 
In order to illustrate the pitfalls of this type of endeavor, I will present and criticize a main school of 
thought in this field, namely the phenomenologists of religion. 
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